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Executive Summary 
Do interstate differences in gasoline prices reflect interstate differences in gas 
taxes?  A simple comparison of interstate gasoline prices and taxes suggests that the 
difference in price does not equal the difference in gasoline taxes.  But the price of 
gasoline can differ for other reasons, for example differences in the wholesale price 
of gasoline.  Thus, it is necessary to control for the other factors that affect the price 
of gasoline.   
We examine this issue, which is really a question regarding the incidence of 
state gasoline excise taxes, i.e., to what extent are differences or changes in tax rates 
reflected in retail prices.  Although the issue of sales and excise tax incidence has 
received considerable attention over the years, most research has focused on tax 
incidence theory.  The standard conclusion of much of this theoretical analysis is that 
consumers bear the full burden of any sales and excise taxes.  Based primarily on this 
theoretical foundation, most applied incidence studies assume that sales and excise 
taxes are fully reflected in consumer prices.  In other words, it is assumed that prices 
respond one-for-one to changes in sales and excise taxes, and therefore that interstate 
differences in gas taxes are reflected one-for-one in gasoline prices.  However, actual 
empirical testing of this assumption of full forward shifting has been surprisingly 
sparse.   
To study this issue, we use monthly price gasoline data for all 50 states in the 
United States over the period 1984 to 1999.  These data allow us to use variation 
across the states in the timing of tax changes to investigate how taxes affect average 
prices in states where the changes occurred.  We estimate a within-group model that 
exploits the panel nature of our data and controls for fixed state and time effects.  We 
also include a full array of control variables, including the state gasoline excise tax, 
demand-side variables, and supply-side factors.  Details of the empirical methodology 
can be found in the report. 
Gasoline taxes have changed considerably over time.  Figure 1 presents the 
distribution of taxes in nominal cents per gallon by state in 1984 and 1999, a period 
that  spans our empirical analysis.  In 1984 the average state tax in nominal terms was  
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Figure 1:  Distribution of State Gasoline Taxes, 1984 and 1999
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11.9 cents per gallon; by 1999 the average state tax had increased to 20.1 cents per 
gallon.  In real terms the tax increase has obviously not been as large as indicated in 
Figure 1, but presenting the data in nominal terms demonstrates that there are many 
policy-driven tax changes over the period of analysis from which we can generate 
estimates of tax incidence.  It is noteworthy that, of the 202 policy driven tax changes 
during the period of analysis, 24 were tax reductions, which provides an opportunity 
to examine whether prices respond asymmetrically to tax increases versus tax 
decreases.  The tax changes were distributed fairly uniformly over this period.  We 
observe 45 tax changes during the 1984-1987 period, 82 changes between 1988 and 
1991, 50 changes from 1992-1995, and 45 changes during the 1996-1999 period. 
Our estimation results generally indicate full shifting of gasoline taxes to the 
final consumer.  In one specification, for example, we find that a 10 cent increase in 
the inflation-adjusted gasoline tax leads to a 9.86 cent increase in the inflation-
adjusted retail price of unleaded gasoline, a magnitude that is not statistically 
significantly different from one (e.g., full shifting).   We also find that changes in 
gasoline taxes are fully reflected in the tax-inclusive gasoline price almost instantly.   
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We also find that the incidence of excise taxes depends upon the 
competitiveness of retail gasoline markets (e.g., urban versus rural markets).  
Gasoline markets in urban states typically exhibit full shifting, but those in rural 
states demonstrate somewhat less than full shifting. 
Our result suggests that there is a one-for-one increase in the tax-inclusive 
gasoline price from an increase in the gasoline tax.  This means that interstate 
differences in gasoline prices, once one controls for other factors such as wholesale 
price of gasoline, equal interstate differences in gas taxes.   
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I. Introduction 
In applied tax incidence studies it is typically assumed that prices respond 
one-for-one to changes in sales and excise taxes (Zupnick, 1975; Shepard, 1976; 
Pechman 1985; Weise, Rose, and Schluter, 1995; Chernick and Reschovsky, 1997; 
Alleyne, Alm, Bahl, and Wallace, 2004; Wisconsin Tax Incidence Study, 2004).  Is 
this assumption reasonable?  Despite the fundamental role of tax incidence in the 
study of public finance, there is surprisingly little empirical analysis that sheds light 
on who bears the burden of taxes.  In this paper, we examine the incidence of state 
gasoline excise taxes, using monthly price data for all 50 states in the United States 
over the period 1984 to 1999.  Our estimation results generally indicate full shifting 
of gasoline taxes to the final consumer, with changes in gasoline taxes fully reflected 
in the tax-inclusive gasoline price almost instantly.  We also find that the incidence of 
excise taxes depends upon the competitiveness of retail gasoline markets (e.g., urban 
versus rural markets).  Gasoline markets in urban states typically exhibit full shifting, 
but those in rural states demonstrate somewhat less than full shifting. 
Although the issue of sales and excise tax incidence has received considerable 
attention over the years, most research has focused on tax incidence theory, and the 
standard conclusion of much of this theoretical analysis is that consumers bear the 
full burden of any sales and excise taxes.1  Based primarily on this theoretical 
foundation, most applied incidence studies assume that sales and excise taxes are 
fully reflected in consumer prices, and the distribution of tax burdens across income 
classes necessarily reflects this assumption.  However, actual empirical testing of this 
assumption of full forward shifting has been surprisingly sparse.2  In important recent 
research, Poterba (1996) and Besley and Rosen (1999) have conducted empirical 
analyses  of  the  incidence of excise taxes.  Poterba (1996) uses city-specific clothing 
                                                          
1 For example, see Brown (1939), Due (1942), Rolph (1952), Musgrave (1959), and Bishop 
(1968).  For more general analyses of the theory of tax incidence, see Harberger (1962), 
Mieszkowski (1967), McLure (1975), Kotlikoff and Summers (1987), and Fullerton and Metcalf 
(2002). 
2For some examples of early empirical research on the incidence of sales and excise taxes, see Due 
(1954), Brownlee and Perry (1967), Woodard and Spiegelman (1967), and Sidhu (1971).  For 
comprehensive discussions of this early work, see Poterba (1996) and Besley and Rosen (1999). 
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and personal care price data covering the 1947-1977 and the 1925-1939 periods to 
examine the degree to which state and local retail sales taxes are shifted to 
consumers, with two data sets based on Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) city-specific 
consumer price indices.  Using these BLS data on tax-inclusive prices, Poterba 
(1996) constructs quarterly price indices for each of 28 Standard Metropolitan 
Statistical Areas (SMSAs).  Many of these 28 SMSAs experienced significant 
changes in sales tax rates, and Poterba (1996) uses these tax “shocks” to determine 
the incidence of sales taxes.  His estimation results are somewhat variable, but in 
general he finds for the post-war period that taxes are fully shifted to consumers; in 
some cases he finds limited evidence of over-shifting, although it is never possible to 
reject the null hypothesis that prices rise “point-for-point” with the changes in the tax, 
and he also finds that full shifting typically (though not always) occurs in the first 
quarter of the tax change.  Poterba (1996) also examines tax incidence for individual 
SMSAs during the Depression era, and his results indicate significant differences 
across metropolitan areas in the degree of tax shifting.  For example, prices on 
women’s clothing in Chicago show significant over-shifting, but Atlanta shows 
negative shifting, a result that does not seem plausible. 
Besley and Rosen (1999) also examine the incidence of sales taxes using 
price data for 12 narrowly defined commodities in 155 different U.S. cities, using 
quarterly price data for the period 1982-1990 issued by the American Chamber of 
Commerce Researchers Association (ACCRA).3  They find full shifting for a number 
of the commodities, but they also find over-shifting for more than half the products, a 
result they attribute to imperfect competition in the retail sector. 
While this recent empirical research has significantly expanded our 
understanding of the actual nature of sales and excise tax incidence, we believe that 
our work here on gasoline excise taxes makes several contributions to the empirical 
literature.  First, we examine regular unleaded gasoline, and so we focus on a 
narrowly defined commodity that has not changed significantly over time in its 
                                                          
3  The ACCRA price information was originally gathered from establishments and neighborhoods 
used by a “mid-management executive household.”  Comparisons by Schoeni (1996) indicate that 
the ACCRA price index is similar to the BLS price index, generating a correlation of 0.715.  
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characteristics.4  Second, it is important in empirical work to obtain reliable cost data 
for use as a key control variable, and one limitation of some previous work is that 
reliable cost data may have been difficult to obtain.  With the retail gasoline market, 
the single most important cost variable is the wholesale price of gasoline, and 
information on its cost (as well as other cost information) is easily obtained.  Third, 
pricing data used in previous studies came almost exclusively from urban markets, 
which are likely to be more competitive than rural areas.  Our gasoline pricing data 
are statewide weighted averages, and are generated from both urban and rural 
markets.  These data are therefore likely to provide a more representative picture of 
tax incidence across an entire state.  Fourth and relatedly, these data allow us to 
examine separately urban and rural gasoline tax incidence, in order to test whether 
more competitive (e.g., urbanized) states yield findings similar to less competitive 
(e.g., rural) states.  Fifth, we use monthly data on prices, rather than the quarterly 
price information of Poterba (1996) and Besley and Rosen (1999).  The use of 
monthly data may allow for a more accurate assessment of the length of time required 
for a complete price response.  Finally, we have a number of tax reductions during 
the period of analysis, so that we can use these episodes of tax reductions to identify 
whether prices respond asymmetrically to tax changes. 
In general, we find full shifting of gasoline taxes to the final consumer, with 
changes in gasoline taxes fully reflected in the tax-inclusive gasoline price almost 
instantly, a result consistent with a retail gasoline market in which firms are perfectly 
competitive and produce at constant cost.  In addition, although we find that gasoline 
retail prices demonstrate asymmetric responses to changes in gasoline wholesale 
prices, we do not find such behavior with respect to gasoline excise taxes.  We also 
find that the incidence of excise taxes depends somewhat upon the competitiveness of 
retail gasoline markets, which depends in turn on spatial aspects of the market.  
Consistent  with  this alternative theoretical perspective, our empirical estimates show 
                                                          
4 For example, Poterba (1996) examines price reactions of “women’s and girl’s clothing,” men’s 
and boys’ clothing” and “personal care items.”  Besley and Rosen (1999) examine more specific 
commodities such as bananas, Crisco, eggs, and shampoo. 
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 4 
that gasoline markets in urban states exhibit full shifting, but those in rural states 
demonstrate less than full shifting. 
In the following sections, we first present a brief overview of state taxation of 
gasoline.  We then discuss a standard theoretical analysis of excise tax incidence, as 
well as a novel application of a spatial price discrimination model of tax incidence.  
We then present our empirical approach, followed by our empirical estimates of retail 
price reactions to changes in taxes.  The final section discusses implications and 
concludes. 
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II. The Practice of State Gasoline Tax Policy 
 Gasoline taxes have changed considerably over time.  Figure 1 presents the 
distribution of taxes in nominal cents per gallon by state in 1984 and 1999, a period 
that spans our empirical analysis.  In 1984 the average state tax in nominal terms was 
11.9 cents per gallon; by 1999 the average state tax had increased to 20.1 cents per 
gallon.  In real terms the tax increase has obviously not been as large as indicated in 
Figure 1, but presenting the data in nominal terms demonstrates that there are many 
policy-driven tax changes over the period of analysis from which we can generate 
estimates of tax incidence.  It is noteworthy that, of the 202 policy driven tax changes 
during the period of analysis, 24 were tax reductions, which provides an opportunity 
to examine whether prices respond asymmetrically to tax increases versus tax 
decreases.  The tax changes were distributed fairly uniformly over this period.  We 
observe 45 tax changes during the 1984-1987 period, 82 changes between 1988 and 
1991, 50 changes from 1992-1995, and 45 changes during the 1996-1999 period. 
As discussed in greater detail in section IV, we also categorize states into 
three groups based on “low,” “medium,” and “high” urbanicity to determine tax 
incidence in environments that differ in spatial competition.  It is important to note 
that the changing patterns in gasoline taxation within these groupings do not exhibit 
any systematic geographical patterns – all three categories are include states from all 
regions (New England, Middle Atlantic, South, Midwest, Southwest, and West). 
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III. Analytical Framework 
As noted by Poterba (1996) and Besley and Rosen (1999) and as we highlight 
below in our analytical framework, in theory the degree of competitiveness is 
important in determining tax incidence.  In the simple case of a perfectly competitive 
market, the after-tax price of a commodity will increase by precisely the amount of 
the tax if supply is perfectly elastic (although by less than the amount of the tax if the 
supply curve slopes upward).  However, if markets are not perfectly competitive, then 
the pattern of excise tax incidence becomes more complicated.5 
Although the retail gasoline market is often considered to be very 
competitive, several studies indicate that market power may exist in certain 
submarkets.  Increased market concentration has been found to lead to higher energy 
market prices in general (Borenstein, Cameron, and Shepard, 1997; Joskow and 
Kahn, 2000) and within the gasoline market in particular (Borenstein and Shepard, 
1996).  There is also some recent evidence from California showing that the 
preservation of a competitive market structure enhances price competition in the 
gasoline market (Hastings, 2004; Verlinda, 2004).  This work suggests that not all 
gasoline markets are perfectly competitive.  Furthermore, Skidmore, Peltier, and Alm 
(2004) find that state government antitrust policies play a role in determining the 
degree of market concentration and competition across states and over time.6 
As a result, we believe that it is possible, indeed likely, that states differ 
systematically in the degree of competitiveness in the gasoline market.  If so, it is 
important to explore whether tax incidence also differs in predictable ways across the 
states that vary in competitiveness. 
Our analytical framework therefore incorporates both kinds of perspectives – 
a perfectly competitive retail gasoline market and a retail market in which firms have 
some market power, based on spatial aspects of the market.  The following 
subsections present both models. 
                                                          
5For example, see the theoretical analyses of Katz and Rosen (1985) and Stern (1987), and the 
empirical work of Sidhu (1971), Poterba (1996), and Besley and Rosen (1999); see also Sumner 
(1981), Bulow and Pfleiderer (1983), and Sullivan (1985). 
6Skidmore, Peltier, and Alm (2004) show that the adoption of a motor fuel sales-below-cost law 
(or a minimum mark-up law) by a state enhances the competitiveness of the retail gasoline market. 
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1. A Simple Model of a Perfectly Competitive Market 
Consider first the simplest case, the introduction of a gasoline excise tax in a 
single, perfectly competitive retail gasoline market.  It is well-known the split of the 
tax between consumers and producers depends upon the relative elasticities of 
demand and supply; consumers bear relatively more of the tax burden the greater is 
elasticity of supply, and relatively less of the burden the greater is the elasticity of 
demand (in absolute value).  In this simple world, there are two circumstances in 
which consumers will bear the full burden of an excise tax on gasoline: if demand is 
perfectly inelastic or if supply is perfectly elastic. 
A simple algebraic example illustrates this scenario.  Suppose that a perfectly 
competitive market has a demand curve defined by [P=a-bQ] and a supply curve 
defined by [P=c+dQ], where a, b, c, and d are positive parameters.  The imposition 
of a specific excise tax t changes the supply curve to [P=c+t+dQ], where the price P 
is interpreted as the gross-of-tax price paid by consumers.  Solving these equations 
gives: 
P=(ad+bc+bt)/(b+d)].       (1) 
The tax therefore raises the price gross-of-tax paid by consumers and lowers the price 
net-of-tax received by producers; that is, ∂P/∂t = b/(b+d), and the incidence is in 
general split between consumers and producers depending upon the slopes (and the 
elasticities) of the demand and supply curves.  The incidence will fall completely on 
consumers (e.g., ∂P/∂t=1) in the special cases that b equals infinity or d equals 0; the 
former case implies that demand is perfectly inelastic, and the latter case implies that 
supply is perfectly elastic.7 
Consequently, although in the short run the incidence is likely to be split 
between consumers and producers, it also seems likely that, as the elasticity of supply 
increases with an increase in the time horizon, the relative burden on consumers will 
increase in the long run in perfectly competitive markets.  Indeed, if in the long run 
the elasticity of supply becomes perfectly elastic, then the burden of the gasoline 
                                                          
7Altering this simple model to allow for monopoly provision of gasoline does not change the basic 
result that the incidence is split between consumers and the producer, although the amount of 
shifting is different than under perfect competition.  With monopoly, the equilibrium price with 
the tax becomes [P= (ab+ad+bc+bt)/(2b+d)], so that [∂P/∂t=b/(2b+d)]. 
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 8 
excise tax will fall completely upon consumers.  Other, more complicated scenarios 
also generally imply that consumers are likely to bear the bulk of the tax burden. 
 
2. A Simple Model of Spatial Price Competition8 
 Now consider instead the standard spatial price discrimination setting, in 
which firms and consumers are dispersed over a geographic, or spatial, environment.  
Because of this spatial distribution, each consumer faces varying travel costs to any 
firm, and each firm faces somewhat separable geographic markets.  In this 
environment, firms have some degree of market power, and price discrimination by 
firms is possible. 
More precisely, assume that each of i=1,…,n firms produces a product with 
constant marginal cost mi and that the cost to firm i of shipping one unit of the good 
from its site to a buyer at distance Ti is Ti dollars.  Because consumers are at varying 
distances from a seller, a discriminating seller will be able to price discriminate, and 
will do so by equalizing marginal revenue on sales to every separable market (and by 
setting marginal revenue equal to marginal cost).  As demonstrated by Greenhut and 
Greenhut (1975), the market equilibrium for spatial competitors who price 
discriminate is given by: 
P(1-1/εn) =( m +T ),       (2) 
where  P  is  again  the  product  price,  ε  is  the  elasticity  of  demand (defined as 
ε≡-∂Q/∂P)(P/Q), Q is the total output in the market, n is the number of firms, m  is 
the average marginal cost of the firms (equal to m≡ ∑i mi/n), and T  is the average 
distance (equal to T ≡∑i Ti/n).  The left-hand side of the market equilibrium 
condition in equation (2) is the usual expression for marginal revenue, and the right-
hand side is the sum of the average marginal cost and the average transportation cost.  
The equilibrium condition simply requires that marginal revenue equals the average 
of full marginal production plus delivery costs across all firms. 
In the special case that the (non-spatial) demand curve is given by the 
exponential form P=b[1-(Q/a)γ], where a and b are the quantity and price intercepts 
                                                          
8This analysis closely follows that of Greenhut and Greenhut (1975). 
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of the demand curve and γ is a parameter that determines the concavity of convexity 
of the demand curve, the elasticity of demand ε equals [(P/(γ(b-P))] and marginal 
revenue becomes [(1/n)(P(n+γ)-γb].  Equating marginal revenue with full marginal 
production plus delivery costs (or m +T ), the delivered price Pd  is shown by 
Greenhut and Greenhut (1975) to equal: 
Pd = (γb + n m  + nT )/(n + γ).      (3) 
Now suppose that a gasoline excise tax t is imposed on all firms.  The excise 
tax changes the market equilibrium equation (2) to: 
P(1-1/εn) = ( m +T + t).      (4) 
It is straightforward to demonstrate that when the (non-spatial) demand curve is given 
by the exponential form the delivered price now becomes: 
Pd = (γb + n m  + nT  + nt)/(n + γ).     (5) 
As emphasized by Greenhut and Greenhut (1975), equation (5) demonstrates that the 
delivered price to any given location is unaffected by the delivered price to any of the 
other locations.  Put differently, equation (5) shows that a spatial competitor has some 
degree of market power because the existence of transportation costs limits the ability 
of consumers to move from one spatial competitor to another.  This result can be 
shown to hold in a number of other, more specific, locational arrangements (Greenhut 
and Greenhut, 1975).  In addition, equation (5) shows that an increase in the number 
of firms will reduce the delivered price as long as [b > m  + T  + t], which is simply 
the condition that the willingness to pay at a quantity of zero (or b) exceeds the 
marginal production costs plus the delivery costs plus the excise tax facing the 
average firm. 
 In the presence of spatial competition, the incidence of a gasoline excise tax 
therefore differs from the simple competitive result.  In particular, the degree of 
shifting depends in part upon the number of firms in the relevant spatial market, so 
that there may well be a difference in gasoline tax incidence between, say, urban and 
rural gasoline markets.  More specifically, taking the partial derivative of equation (5) 
with respect to t yields ∂Pd/∂t= n/(n + γ), showing that as n increases (i.e., the market 
becomes more competitive) a higher portion of the tax will be passed on to 
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consumers. The next section presents our empirical approach for estimating the 
incidence of the gasoline tax. 
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IV. Empirical Framework 
1. Methods 
We collect monthly price and tax data for all states, which allows us to use 
variation across the states in the timing of tax changes to investigate how taxes affect 
average prices in states where the changes occurred.  We estimate a within-group 
model that exploits the panel nature of our data and controls for fixed state and time 
effects.  We also include a full array of control variables, including the state gasoline 
excise tax, demand-side variables, and supply-side factors. 
The econometric model is as follows.  Denote Pit as the real monthly 
weighted average tax inclusive end-user price of unleaded gasoline for state i in 
period t.  We assume that the relationship between the explanatory variables and the 
price of unleaded gasoline is given by: 
Pit = titα + Xitβ + μi + ηt + εit  ,     (6) 
where tit represents the tax in real cents per gallon in state i at time t, Xit is a vector of 
demand-side and supply-side characteristics that determine prices, μi and ηt are fixed 
state and monthly time effects,9 α and β are coefficient vectors, and εit is a random 
error term.  In several specifications, we also utilize the log-linear version of this 
equation to examine robustness. 
The fixed-effects model is appropriate for our analysis for two reasons.  First, 
much of the variation in prices is between states rather than within states.  Although it 
would be difficult to specify all the institutional, economic, and demographic 
characteristics that determine the differences across states in prices, we can capture 
permanent differences between states with state fixed-effects.  Similarly, there are 
many factors that may affect prices over time, and we capture those differences with 
monthly time-effects.  Second, the fixed-effects model is a within-group estimator 
that uses a weighted average of the within-state and the across-state variation to form 
the parameter estimates.  Therefore, our estimate of the effects of tax changes 
measures how prices change within the states as taxes change.10 
                                                          
9One time indicator variable is omitted to avoid perfect multicollinearity. 
10Hsiao (1986) presents an excellent discussion of panel data estimation procedures. 
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Given that our panel consists of 50 states for which we have monthly series 
over 16 years, it is likely that the errors are serially correlated.  A Durbin-Watson test 
indicates that autocorrelation is a concern, and all standard errors are adjusted for 
autocorrelation using an AR1 procedure.  
 
2. Data 
Our dependent variable is the inflation-adjusted monthly tax-inclusive retail 
price of unleaded gasoline in state i for time period t, measured in cents per gallon (or 
in its natural log).  We obtain information on the retail and wholesale prices for the 
years 1984 to 1999 from a report published by the U.S. Energy Information 
Administration (Petroleum Marketing Monthly). The Petroleum Marketing Monthly 
reports retail and wholesale prices that are inflation-adjusted weighted averages net of 
all federal, state, and local sales and excise taxes, and are drawn from a sample of 
over 3,500 companies. 11  As discussed below, we collect detailed information on 
state gasoline taxes.  To obtain a measure of the tax-inclusive price (P), we add the 
retail price obtained from the Petroleum Marketing Monthly and our tax measure 
together. 
We use weighted averages of both the retail and wholesale prices of gasoline 
across the entire state, rather than price data from a few selected cities and/or 
localities, to analyze consumer activity and behavior within a given state as a whole.  
Along the same lines, we believe that the use of a weighted monthly average gasoline 
price data over a substantial period of time captures more accurately both the 
immediate and the long-run impact of gasoline taxes on gasoline retail prices within 
each state.   As noted by Skidmore, Peltier, and Alm (2004), one drawback to the use 
of state-average measures of price is that potential differential effects in sub-markets 
within a given state cannot be captured.  Overcoming this limitation is cumbersome 
given that it is difficult to obtain consistent disaggregated data for an extended period 
of time (e.g., data collected and analyzed at the store level for all states). 
                                                          
11  For a more detailed discussion, see http://www.eia.doe.gov/oil_gas/petroleum/ 
data_publications/petroleum_marketing_monthly/pmm.html. 
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We include several explanatory variables to measure the variations in the 
gasoline retail price across states and over time.  Our primary regressor is the 
inflation-adjusted state gasoline tax, measured in real cents per gallon.12  Our 
specifications include variants of this gasoline tax variable: the level of the gasoline 
tax in cents per gallon, the natural logarithm of the gasoline tax, and lagged values of 
the gasoline tax (in order to account for the fact that changes in the gasoline tax may 
take time to be fully reflected in gasoline prices).  
To assess the impact of gasoline taxes on gasoline prices, it is necessary to 
control for other factors that potentially affect gasoline prices.  Following Vita (2000) 
and Skidmore, Peltier, and Alm (2004), we include several demand-side and supply-
side factors that influence gasoline prices.  These include: the average annual real 
retail wage, real per capita income, the total number of vehicles per capita, the total 
number of licensed drivers per capita, the real resale gasoline price (real wholesale 
price of unleaded gasoline in cents), the number of heating days in the census region 
(average heating degree days), and population density.  As noted above, we include 
state and time dummy variables to control for the unobservable, permanent 
differences across states as well as the factors that affect all prices over time.13  
Finally, following Skidmore, Peltier, and Alm (2004), we include a reformulated 
gasoline dummy variable.  Beginning 1 January 1994, the Clean Air Act 
Amendments of 1990 required that cleaner burning and more expensive reformulated 
gasoline be sold in the nine worst “ozone nonattainment” areas; the reformulated 
gasoline  dummy  is included to control for this factor.14  Table 1 gives the definitions 
                                                          
12In principle, we might also include the federal gasoline excise tax.  However, since the federal 
tax is the same for all states at any given time, the time effects control for this.  Since we cannot 
include both the time effects and the federal tax simultaneously, we choose to include only the 
time effects.  Our tax measure also includes local taxes that are consistently applied statewide, but 
not location-specific taxes.  Including local excise and sales taxes imposed on gasoline is difficult 
to incorporate into a statewide analysis.  However, the estimated coefficient on the state tax 
variable is only biased by this omission if changes in state taxes are systematically correlated with 
changes in local taxes. 
13State fixed effects capture any permanent differences across states (e.g., laws banning self-
service, divorcement, transportation costs) not otherwise captured by other explanatory variables.  
Similarly, the time effects capture any variation in prices over time that affects the whole country 
(e.g., changes in national environmental standards, federal excise taxes, crude oil prices). 
14These areas are Baltimore, Chicago, Hartford, Houston, Los Angeles, Milwaukee, New York, 
Philadelphia, and San Diego.  Also, Sacramento was added later. 
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TABLE 1. VARIABLE DEFINITIONS AND SOURCES 
Variable Details Source 
Average Annual 
Inflation Adjusted 
Wage Per Service 
Station Employee 
SIC 5541: Gasoline Service Station, 
Average Annual Inflation Adjusted 
Wage Per Service Station Employee in 
the State 
 
Http://stats.bls.gov/sahome.
html 
Drivers Per Capita Total Number of Driver Licenses 
Divided by State Population 
Federal Highway Admin- 
istration, Highway Statistics, 
1980-1999 
Heating Degree Days Heating Degree Days by Census 
Division (where “Heating Degree-Days” 
are deviations from the mean daily 
temperature below 65F) 
 
Http://www.eia.doe.gov/em
eu/aer/overview.html 
Per Capita Income Inflation Adjusted Per Capita Income Http://www.bea.doc.gov/be
a/regional/data.htm 
Population Total State Population Http://www.census.gov/pop
ulation/www/estimates/state
pop.html 
Population Density Total State Population Divided by State 
Land Area in Square Miles  
Http://www.census.gov/pop
ulation/www/estimates/state
pop.html 
Proportion of Drivers 
Between the Ages of 
20 and 44 
Number of Drivers Between Ages of 20 
and 44 Divided by Total Number of 
Drivers in the State 
 
Federal Highway Admin- 
istration, Highway Statistics, 
1980-1999 
Proportion of Popu-
lation Over the Age 
of 65 
 
Proportion of Population Over 65 
Within the State 
Http://www.census.gov/pop
ulation/www/estimates/state
pop.html 
Retail Price of 
Unleaded Gasoline 
Average Monthly Inflation Adjusted 
Price of Unleaded Gasoline Sales to 
End-users Net of All Taxes (where 
“Sales to End-users” are sales made 
directly to the ultimate consumer, 
including bulk customers such as 
agriculture, industry, and utilities, as 
well as residential and commercial 
customers) 
 
Energy Information Admin-
istration, Petroleum Mar-
keting Monthly, 1984-1999 
State Gasoline Tax State Gasoline Tax in Inflation Adjusted 
Cents Per Gallon 
Federal Highway Admin- 
istration, Highway Statistics, 
1980-1999 
Vehicles Per Popu- 
lation 
Total Number of Vehicles Divided by 
State Population 
Federal Highway Admin- 
istration, Highway Statistics, 
1980-1999 
Wholesale Price of 
Unleaded Gasoline 
Average Monthly Inflation Adjusted 
Price of Unleaded Gasoline Sales for 
Resale Net of All Taxes (where “Sales 
for Resale” are those made to purchasers 
who are other than ultimate consumers) 
Energy Information Admin 
istration, Petroleum Mar-
keting Monthly, 1984-1999 
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and sources of the variables, and Table 2 provides summary statistics on the 
variables. 
On the demand side, Vita (2000) has shown that gasoline demand is 
influenced by population and population density.  An increased population may lead 
to increased demand for gasoline and thus an increase in price.  The effect of 
population density is ambiguous.  More densely populated areas have other 
alternative transportation modes, leading to a reduction in demand.15  However, more 
densely populated areas experience greater traffic congestion and thus more fuel 
consumption per mile traveled, as well as higher rental values, and these factors 
suggest that prices may be higher in more densely populated areas.  We also include 
the number of vehicles per capita, the number of drivers per capita, and income per 
capita to control for changes in gasoline demand. 
On the supply side, we include the real annual retail wage variable, to control 
for changes in wage costs for gasoline retailers. Following Borenstein, Cameron, and 
Shepard (1997) and Vita (2000), we include average heating degree days as an 
exogenous determinant of gasoline production costs.16  Finally, we include the 
wholesale gasoline price variable in the retail price regressions to control for changes 
in the most important input cost for retailers.  We include the reformulated gasoline 
dummy to control for the Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990 regulations on ozone 
nonattainment regions. 
 
                                                          
15On the supply side increased population density may lead to reduced wholesale transport costs. 
16Transportation and production costs of gasoline are affected by the demand for jointly produced 
products such as home heating oil, which has a demand that is weather determined.  Gasoline is a 
by-product of the production of home heating oil so that gasoline and home heating oil are 
complements in production but substitutes in transportation.  The expected sign on this variable is 
indeterminate. 
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TABLE 2. SUMMARY STATISTICS FOR ALL STATES, 1984 TO 1999 
 
Variable 
 
Mean 
Standard 
Deviation 
Weight 1.00 0.01 
reformD (Reformulated Gasoline Dummy) 0.05 0.22 
crudeprice (Crude Oil Price) 18.23 93.05 
euser  (Real Retail Price of Unleaded Gasoline in Cents) 77.71 13.02 
resale (Real Wholesale Price of Unleaded Gasoline in Cents) 66.11 12.78 
rtax (Real State Gasoline Tax in Cents) 18.98 4.69 
pop  (Population in Thousands) 5075.66 5492.11 
rincome  (Real Per Capita Income in Dollars) 21901.70 3869.38 
density (Population Density) 167.41 231.13 
pccveh  (Vehicles Per Capita) 0.79 0.12 
pcdriv  (Drivers Per Capita) 0.68 0.05 
rwage (Average Annual Real Retail Wage in Dollars) 13946.88 1734.68 
heatdays (Average Heating Degree Days in the Census 
Region) 
4687.17 1663.50 
lnresale  (Natural log of resale) 4.17 0.19 
lneuser (Natural log of euser) 4.34 0.17 
lnrwage  (Natural log of rwage) 9.41 0.19 
lnpop  (Natural log of pop) 8.05 1.01 
lnrincome (Natural log of rincome) 9.98 0.17 
lndensity  (Natural log of density) 4.30 1.42 
lnpcveh (Natural log of pcveh) -0.24 0.14 
lnpcdriv (Natural log of pcdriv) -0.38 0.08 
lnheatdays (Natural log of heatdays) 8.38 0.39 
lncrudeprice (Natural log of crudeprice ) 2.81 0.26 
rtax1 (Lag of rtax) 18.98 4.69 
resale1 (Lag of resale) 66.04 12.82 
lnrtax1 (Natural log of rtax1) 2.91 0.27 
lnresale1 (Natural log of resale1) 4.17 0.19 
ctax (rtax-rtax1) 0.01 0.44 
cresale (resale-resale1) -0.05 4.43 
clntax (lnrtax-lnrtax1) 0.00 0.02 
clnresale (lnresale-lnresale1) 0.00 0.07 
P (Tax-inclusive Real Retail Price of Unleaded Gasoline in 
cents) 
96.69 13.26 
lnP (Natural log of P) 4.56 0.14 
positivedummy1 (Dummy=1 if ctax>0) 0.03 0.17 
positivedummy2 (Dummy=1 if cresale>0) 0.51 0.50 
positivedummy3 (Dummy=1 if clntax>0) 0.03 0.17 
positivedummy4 (Dummy=1 if clnresale>0) 0.51 0.50 
ctaxpd (ctax * positivedummy1) 0.04 0.41 
cresalepd (cresale * positivedummy1) 1.57 2.69 
clntaxpd (clntax * positivedummy1) 0.00 0.02 
clnresalepd (clnresale * positivedummy1) 0.02 0.04 
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V. Estimation Results 
1. Linear Specifications 
Consider first Table 3, which presents the estimation results from a linear 
model without lags, and from a linear model that includes a single lag for both the tax 
variable and the wholesale price variable.17  Specification 1 of Table 3 reveals that a 
10 cent increase in the inflation-adjusted gasoline tax leads to a 9.86 cent increase in 
the inflation-adjusted retail price of unleaded gasoline, a magnitude that is not 
significantly different from one (e.g., full shifting).  This result therefore suggests that 
there is a one-for-one increase in the tax-inclusive gasoline price from an increase in 
the gasoline tax, a result consistent with a retail gasoline market in which firms are 
perfectly competitive and produce at constant cost 
Specification 2 in Table 3 reveals that there is no statistical evidence of 
lagged responses of tax inclusive gasoline prices to changes in the gasoline tax, so 
that prices shift fully during the first month of the tax change.  If we sum the 
coefficients on the tax variable and on the lagged tax variable, the full effect is 9.85 
cents, a result that is again consistent with full forward shifting of a 10 cent increase 
in the gasoline tax. 
The control variables generally have the expected signs, although several 
coefficients are statistically insignificant and one is contrary to expectations.  For 
instance, a one cent increase in the wholesale price of gasoline raises the tax-inclusive 
price by nine-tenths of a cent.  Also as expected, increases in real income per capita 
and retail wages are correlated with higher prices, and an increase in the average 
number of heating degree days is negatively correlated with prices.  More drivers per 
capita lead to higher prices, but, somewhat surprisingly, an increase in the number of 
vehicles per capita is associated with lower prices.  The population variables and the 
reformulated gasoline dummy variable are not significant determinants of retail price. 
 
                                                          
17Changes in the gasoline taxes may not be instantaneously reflected in the tax-inclusive gasoline 
price.  We include the lag of the gasoline tax to account for this effect; additional lags beyond one 
month provide no additional information to the regression. 
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TABLE 3. PERFECT COMPETITION: LINEAR SPECIFICATIONS  
(T-VALUE IN PARENTHESES) 
Dependent Variable: Tax-Inclusive Price 
 (1) (2) 
rtax 0.986 0.983 
 (75.33)** (16.62)** 
rtax1  0.002 
  (0.03) 
resale 0.903 0.604 
 (113.65)** (47.66)** 
resale1  0.378 
  (29.99)** 
density -0.004 -0.005 
 (0.93) (1.14) 
pcveh -1.800 -1.580 
 (2.99)** (2.75)** 
pcdriv 4.746 4.622 
 (4.95)** (5.03)** 
tincome 0.000 0.000 
 (2.91)** (4.49)** 
heatdays -0.000 -0.000 
 (2.81)** (2.21)* 
rwage 0.000 0.000 
 (1.65) (1.59) 
reformD 0.134 0.178 
 (0.80) (1.11) 
Constant 14.516 7.785 
 (8.89)** (4.73)** 
Observations 9600 9500 
Number of States 50 50 
R-squared 0.95 0.96 
* significant at 5%; ** significant at 1% 
All regressions include state and time fixed effects. 
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2. Log-Linear Specifications 
Specifications 3 and 4 in Table 4 use double log functions, and thus the 
coefficient estimates are interpreted as elasticities.  These specifications indicate that 
a 10 cent increase in the gasoline tax raises the tax-inclusive gasoline price by 9.5 
cents.18  These results further confirm that gasoline tax changes lead to complete (or 
nearly complete) forward tax shifting.   As in specifications 1 and 2 in Table 3, the 
other key explanatory variable, or the wholesale price of gasoline, again exerts a 
positive and statistically significant impact on the tax-inclusive gasoline price.  
Further, specifications 3 and 4 show that gasoline prices in the nine worst ozone 
nonattainment areas are on average about one percent higher compared to the other 
states in our sample, as shown by the positive and statistically significant coefficient 
on the reformD variable in both specifications 3 and 4. 
 
3. Asymmetric Responses 
Specifications 5 and 6 in Table 5 test for the asymmetric response of gasoline 
prices to gasoline tax changes.  Here we test the hypothesis that the tax-inclusive 
gasoline price is more responsive to gasoline excise tax increases than to gasoline tax 
reductions.  Given that previous work shows that retail prices respond asymmetrically 
to wholesale prices, we also examine whether the tax-inclusive gasoline price 
responds asymmetrically to changes in gasoline wholesale prices. 
To test these hypotheses, we construct the variables ctaxpd and cresalepd, 
which are dummy variables equal to one if tax changes (ctaxpd) or wholesale price 
changes (cresalepd) are positive and equal to zero otherwise.  The existence of an 
asymmetric response will be reflected by positive and statistically significant 
coefficients on the ctaxpd and cresalepd variables.  As shown in specifications 5 and 
6 in Table 5, there is no statistical evidence of an asymmetric responsive of tax-
inclusive gasoline prices to changes in gasoline taxes.  However, these specifications 
also  reveal  that tax-inclusive gasoline prices are more responsive to increases than to 
                                                          
18Interpreting the tax coefficient as an elasticity (ε) and using average values of the tax-inclusive 
gasoline price (P) and the real gasoline tax per unit of 96.69 and 18.98 cents, respectively, then the 
impact of the excise tax on price is given by ∆P = [ε (∆t/t) P].  This equation yields ∆P = 0.948 
for specification 3 in Table 4.  A similar estimate is found for specification 4. 
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TABLE 4. PERFECT COMPETITION: LOG SPECIFICATIONS 
(T-VALUE IN PARENTHESES) 
 
 
Dependent Variable:  
Natural Log of Tax-Inclusive Price lnP 
 (3) (4) 
lnrtax 0.186 0.185 
 (75.34)** (16.40)** 
lnrtax1  0.001 
  (0.08) 
lnresale 0.577 0.394 
 (105.34)** (46.10)** 
lnresale1  0.235 
  (27.63)** 
lndensity 0.121 0.108 
 (17.13)** (15.68)** 
lnpcveh 0.041 0.037 
 (7.13)** (6.72)** 
lnpcdriv 0.069 0.064 
 (10.61)** (10.25)** 
lnrincome -0.058 -0.039 
 (5.33)** (3.63)** 
lnheatdays -0.017 -0.016 
 (3.06)** (3.07)** 
lnrwage 0.021 0.021 
 (3.61)** (3.61)** 
reformD 0.009 0.009 
 (5.19)** (5.53)** 
Constant 1.661 1.292 
 (14.14)** (11.13)** 
Observations 9600 9500 
Number of States 50 50 
R-squared 0.95 0.96 
* significant at 5%; ** significant at 1% 
All regressions include state and time fixed effects. 
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TABLE 5. PERFECT COMPETITION: LINEAR AND LOG ASYMMETRIC  
RESPONSE SPECIFICATIONS (T-VALUE IN PARENTHESES) 
 
 
 
Dependent Variable:  
Tax-Inclusive Price P 
Dependent variable:  
Natural Log of  
Tax-Inclusive Price lnP 
 (5)  (6) 
Rtax 0.741 Lnrtax 0.072 
 (2.55)*  (1.00) 
rtax1 0.242 lnrtax1 0.114 
 (0.83)  (1.57) 
Ctaxpd 0.243 Clntaxpd 0.121 
 (0.75)  (1.53) 
Resale 0.428 Lnresale 0.287 
 (22.67)**  (22.85)** 
resale1 0.552 lnresale1 0.348 
 (29.49)**  (26.92)** 
Cresalepd 0.377 Clnresalepd 0.239 
 (12.51)**  (11.58)** 
density -0.005 Lndensity 0.104 
 (1.21)  (15.26)** 
pcveh -1.561 Lnpcveh 0.036 
 (2.74)**  (6.61)** 
pcdriv 4.605 Lnpcdriv 0.063 
 (5.05)**  (10.17)** 
Rincome 0.000 Lnrincome -0.039 
 (4.61)**  (3.70)** 
Heatdays -0.000 Lnheatdays -0.014 
 (2.00)*  (2.73)** 
Rwage 0.000 Lnrwage 0.022 
 (1.69)  (3.80)** 
reformD 0.134 reformD 0.009 
 (0.84)  (5.31)** 
Constant 7.624 Constant 1.257 
 (4.82)**  (10.90)** 
Observations 9500 Observations 9500 
Number of States 50 Number of States 50 
R-squared 0.96 R-squared 0.96 
*significant at 5%; ** significant at 1% 
All regressions include state and time fixed effects. 
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decreases in gasoline wholesale prices. This finding is consistent with Borenstein, 
Cameron, and Shepard (1997), who find that retail gasoline prices respond more 
quickly to increases than to decreases in crude oil prices.  Specifications 5 and 6 also 
indicate that a 10 cent increase in the gasoline tax raises the tax-inclusive gasoline 
price by 9.83 cents, a result that is consistent with full forward shifting. 
 
4. Spatial Competition and Prices 
The estimation results in Tables 6 and 7 examine whether price reactions are 
similar in markets with differing levels of competitiveness.  Here we split the states 
into three equally sized categories based on a constructed measure of urbanicity (e.g., 
low, medium, and high urbanicity), and we estimate separate regressions on each sub-
sample to examine whether tax shifting differs systematically among these states.  
Given that urban areas exhibit a more competitive retail gasoline market, our 
theoretical discussion indicates that urbanized states should experience close to full 
forward shifting, while rural states should experience less than full shifting. 
More specifically, we create a measure of “urbanicity” to proxy the level of 
market competition in the retail gasoline market.  Our data are sorted in ascending 
order according to the proportion of the population residing in urban areas.  We then 
group the states into three categories defined as “low”, “medium”, and “high” urban 
states.  The cut-offs for the proportion in urban areas are chosen to classify 
approximately 1/3 of the states in each category, and are specified as 32.2 percent to 
63.2 percent for the low urbanicity category, 64.9 percent to 74.1 percent for medium 
urbanicity, and 76.4 percent to 92.6 percent for high urbanicity.19  States in these 
groupings  do  not  exhibit  any  systematic  geographical  patterns;  that  is,  all  three  
                                                          
19The “low” urbanicity category has 17 states, including Alabama, Arkansas, Georgia, Idaho, 
Iowa, Kentucky, Maine, Mississippi, Montana, North Carolina, North Dakota, New Hampshire, 
South Carolina, South Dakota, Tennessee, Vermont, and West Virginia.  The “medium” urbanicity 
category also includes 17 states: Alaska, Delaware, Kansas, Indiana, Louisiana, Michigan, 
Minnesota, Missouri, Nebraska, New Mexico, Ohio, Oklahoma, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Virginia, 
Wisconsin, and Wyoming.  The “high” category includes 16 states, or Arizona, California, 
Colorado, Connecticut, Florida, Hawaii, Illinois, Maryland, Massachusetts, Nevada, New Jersey, 
New York, Rhode Island, Texas, Utah, and Washington. 
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TABLE 6. SPATIAL COMPETITION: LINEAR SPECIFICATIONS  
(T-VALUE IN PARENTHESES) 
Dependent Variable: Tax-Inclusive Price P 
 (7) Low Urban (8) Medium Urban (9) High Urban 
rtax 0.945 1.004 1.014 
 (39.79)** (38.26)** (46.64)** 
resale 0.745 0.905 0.907 
 (50.34)** (55.12)** (70.84)** 
density -0.098 -0.013 -0.024 
 (8.36)** (1.37) (3.91)** 
pcveh 0.556 10.266 -15.950 
 (0.70) (6.89)** (12.44)** 
pcdriv -4.948 14.986 -7.697 
 (4.08)** (6.78)** (3.93)** 
rincome 0.000 -0.000 0.001 
 (2.17)* (4.89)** (8.92)** 
heatdays 0.001 -0.001 0.000 
 (5.68)** (5.15)** (0.11) 
rwage 0.000 0.000 -0.000 
 (7.57)** (2.29)* (0.29) 
reformD 0.000 -0.914 -0.914 
 (.) (2.13)* (4.12)** 
Constant 26.830 11.591 26.845 
 (10.39)** (3.71)** (7.93)** 
Observations 3200 3200 3200 
Number of States 16 17 17 
R-squared 0.97 0.95 0.95 
* significant at 5%; ** significant at 1% 
All regressions include state and time fixed effects. 
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TABLE 7. SPATIAL COMPETITION: LINEAR ASYMMETRIC RESPONSE 
SPECIFICATIONS (T-VALUE IN PARENTHESES) 
Dependent Variable: Tax-Inclusive Price P 
  
(10) Low Urban 
(11) Medium 
Urban 
 
(12) High Urban 
rtax 0.394 0.461 1.297 
 (0.67) (0.97) (2.80)** 
rtax1 0.541 0.517 -0.270 
 (0.93) (1.10) (0.58) 
ctaxpd 0.644 0.637 -0.391 
 (1.00) (1.18) (0.77) 
resale 0.352 0.455 0.404 
 (11.24)** (13.37)** (12.17)** 
resale1 0.475 0.551 0.572 
 (15.30)** (16.27)** (17.40)** 
cresalepd 0.299 0.389 0.413 
 (5.82)** (6.94)** (8.18)** 
density -0.092 -0.015 -0.018 
 (8.23)** (1.67) (3.15)** 
pcveh 0.605 9.180 -15.841 
 (0.80) (6.47)** (13.02)** 
pcdriv -4.055 13.806 -7.922 
 (3.48)** (6.53)** (4.26)** 
rincome 0.000 -0.000 0.001 
 (2.84)** (3.53)** (10.73)** 
heatdays 0.001 -0.001 0.000 
 (6.84)** (5.15)** (0.48) 
rwage 0.000 0.000 -0.000 
 (7.58)** (2.94)** (1.45) 
reformD 0.000 -0.761 -0.748 
 (.) (1.87) (3.55)** 
Constant 11.551 5.259 17.027 
 (4.43)** (1.64) (5.01)** 
Observations 3165 3167 3168 
Number of States 16 17 17 
R-squared 0.97 0.96 0.95 
* significant at 5%; ** significant at 1% 
All regressions include state and time fixed effects. 
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categories include states from all regions (e.g., New England, Middle Atlantic, South, 
Midwest, Southwest and West).  As shown in specification 7 in Table 6, the low 
urbanicity states exhibit marginally less than full shifting.  For every 10 cent increase 
in taxes, retail prices increase by 9.4 cents in the low urbanicity states, a result that is 
statistically different than full shifting at the 99 percent confidence level.  In contrast, 
the medium and high urbanicity regressions (specifications 8 and 9) reveal full 
shifting. 
In Table 7, we present three additional specifications that examine both the 
timing and the asymmetry of the price response in the low, medium, and high 
urbanicity states.  In the low and medium states, we observe a full price response in 
two months; however, in the high urban states the price response is immediate.  In 
fact, the analysis suggests that in high urban states the price response in the first 
month is greater than full shifting, but in the second month prices fall to reflect full 
shifting.  As with Table 4, we again find no evidence of asymmetric responses to 
price changes. 
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VI. Conclusions  
So who bears the burden of gasoline excise taxes?  We find strong and 
consistent evidence of full shifting of gasoline taxes to the final consumer.  We also 
find that changes in gasoline taxes are reflected almost instantly in the tax-inclusive 
gasoline price, whereas gasoline retail prices exhibit a more gradual response to 
changes in gasoline wholesale prices.  Additionally, although gasoline retail prices 
depict asymmetric responses to changes in gasoline wholesale prices, no such 
behavior of retail prices is reflected with respect to changes in gasoline excise taxes.  
Finally, our estimation results indicate that tax shifting depends in part on the degree 
of competition in a state, with less than full shifting in more rural (and so less 
competitive) states. 
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